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The De-Civilizing Process and Urban Working Class Y outh in Scotland  
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to overcome the rather static effect of de-historicized, fixed 
categories of the British ‘underclass’. Specifically, we map the socio-historical 
development of class disdain and disgust across the distinct state-societies of 
Scotland and England through the frame of Norbert Elias’ account of civilizing 
and de-civilizing processes. Differences in the historical development of urban 
Scotland produced a colloquial common sense about lower working class 
‘Neds’ that oscillates between ‘humor’ and moral outrage. Symbolic power is 
lubricated at regular intervals by a distinctive, semi-autonomous Scottish 
media. This is closely associated in the public imagination with more than a 
century of de-civilized violent gang disorder. In turn, this is accentuated by an 
autonomous Scottish criminal justice system and, since 1999, the devolution 
of major administrative state functions culminating in the prospect of Scottish 
independence dissolving the UK state. This fact colors all discourses about 
the underclass in Scotland. 
 
Keywords : Scotland, state autonomy, class, underclass, de-civilizing and 
civilizing processes, criminalization, symbolic power. 
 
Introduction  
One effect of the historical precedence of Britain’s early development as a 
capitalist state-society is the deep imprint produced by distinctions of social 
class. In this context, and until relatively recently, the social category ‘working 
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class’ was often worn with pride as a badge of honor in British society. It 
provided dominated groups with a positive framework for collective self-
understanding and identity. Material impoverishment was compensated in part 
by collective representations of class as an authorized and legitimated source 
of social solidarity. Relations of class depended on a relatively stable 
dichotomy of insiders and outsiders. ‘Folk like us’ were frank, honest and 
unpretentious while ‘people like them’ were aloof, pompous and disingenuous. 
If this image of the British working class too often romanticized, ennobled and 
homogenized a more complex and internally divided social reality, it 
nonetheless contained a kernel of truth.  
 
Today, however, elementary truths about Britain as a definite kind of class 
society are routinely traduced and derided. Over the past two decades ‘class’ 
as a structured socio-economic relationship has fallen from public 
consciousness. It is now an unreliable marker of party political alignment. In 
the 2000s New Labour governments attempted to expunge ‘class’ from the 
lexicon of British politics under its ‘Respect’ agenda (see Millie, 2009). The 
removal of ‘class’ as a political language of social divisions and interests has 
the effect of obscuring the social structures that determine the possible 
positions that individuals are compelled to occupy in social space. In its place, 
public discourses of ‘respect and responsibility’ through to the Conservative 
Liberal Democrat UK Coalition government’s ‘big society’ elevate moral, 
cultural and individualistic explanations of social suffering (see Hancock, 
Mooney and Neal, 2012). Denial of the structuring effects of class position 
removes from the socially dominated a crucial source of collective claim-
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making. Instead of structural disadvantage in the labor market the blame for 
material and symbolic dispossession is laid at the door of genetically or 
morally flawed individuals in ways not so dissimilar from Victorian images of 
the ‘dissolute’ and ‘undeserving’ urban poor. And, vice versa, economic 
success becomes the morally deserved result of genetically and culturally 
successful individuals and their children.  
 
In this sphere, as Norbert Elias (2012) classically demonstrated, feelings of 
responsibility, obligation, reciprocity, shame, and propriety are induced as an 
unintended, spontaneous effect of functional interdependencies. Within the 
centuries-old process of increased self-restraint, de-civilizing ‘spurts’ forcibly 
reassert formal relations of superiority and inferiority that had hitherto been in 
long-term decline. This is not simply a one-way process, although it may lead 
to a self-perpetuating cycle of political violence and social disintegration. 
Elias’s focus on the dialectical tension between civilization and de-civilizing 
processes may be substituted for reified states of being giving rise to a focus 
on social and psychological problems of ‘incivility’ and criminalization (Rodger, 
2008). Individuals and cultures that are removed from the force of wider 
interdependencies, above all, of the labor market and organizational 
hierarchies, also escape from external disciplines that demand ‘civilized’ 
attitudes and conduct. Lacking middle class aspirations, a supposedly 
indulgent culture of welfare entitlement and public sector self-interest allows 
inferior social groups to draw on the public good one-sidedly without making 
any productive contribution in return. Elementary codes of conduct, decency, 
courtesy and civility are thought to have atrophied within the most deprived 
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social groups of the working class. Unemployed or under-employed welfare 
recipients therefore appear to lack the values and behaviors of wider ‘civil’ 
society.  
 
Against decadent underclass cultures, UK public policy, at least since the 
election of New Labour in 1997, engaged in failing attempts to forcibly correct 
and modify the attitudinal and behavioral deficiencies of dysfunctional 
individuals and families. Above all, the failure of lower social groups was 
viewed by New Labour as one of moral indifference and a work avoidance 
ethos (Haylett, 2001). However, this emphasis on the need for public policy to 
engage and modify decadent cultures ignored a substantial body of evidence 
that points to contrary conclusions about changing structures of employment 
as the primary determinant of poverty and inequality in Britain. Half of all 
adults living in poverty in the UK are from households that work (52 per cent), 
either part-time (16 percent), with one or more adult in full-time work (22 
percent) or self-employed (11 percent) (McKendrick et al, 2011: 101). Low pay 
and structural unemployment and underemployment, not cultural attitudes or 
uncivil conduct, remain root causes of class dispossession and social 
suffering. 
 
In this climate, the label ‘working class’ no longer functions in Britain as a 
marker of authenticity, solidity and respectability but circulates as something 
base, superficial, backward and shameful: the working class have gone from 
mythical ‘salt of the earth’ to reviled ‘scum of the earth’ (Jones, 2011). 
Whether belligerent youth, benefit claimants, council tenants or public sector 
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trade unions, the working class seem distinctly garish, outdated and 
ungrateful, a moral rubbish heap set against a society newly-minted as 
‘middle class’ according to the self-images of the neoliberal imagination. If the 
‘working class’ figures at all in public discourse then it is as a marginal identity 
of the young, white urban poor, subject to populist moral and emotional 
denigration, fear and contempt. In the past two decades, acute public 
concerns emerged around cultural representations of the marginal figure of 
‘the Chav’ in England and ‘the Ned’ in Scotland. These categories function as 
folk devils to evoke middle class feelings of disgust, fear, embarrassment and 
repugnance (Jones, 2011; Law, 2006a). Middle class entertainers, politicians 
and journalists embrace discourses about ‘Chavs’ and ‘Neds’ - other forms of 
group hate being ruled out of the game – in a conspicuous display of the 
cultural competence and moral standards that are required on the other, 
civilized side of the social ledger.  
 
This paper seeks to overcome the rather static effect of de-historicized, fixed 
categories of the British ‘underclass’. A virulent discourse of disdain and 
disgust circulates that deploys euphemistic language about a British 
underclass, alternately termed ‘Chavs’ in England and ‘Neds’ in Scotland. 
Crucially, we seek to shift the optic from the figure of the Chav to that of the 
Ned. This responds to differences in the socio-historic development of class 
disdain in the distinct nations of Scotland and England, despite the fact that 
they both inhabit the same nation-state, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (Law, 2006b). National socio-historical development 
tends to disappear under the widespread assumption that the Chav 
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phenomenon in England automatically resonates elsewhere in the UK, albeit 
under different names. Differences in the historical development of urban 
working class Scotland have produced a casual familiarity with Neds through 
a colloquial common sense that oscillates between ‘humor’ and moral 
outrage. Symbolic power is lubricated at regular intervals by a distinctive, 
semi-autonomous Scottish media. This is closely associated in the public 
imagination with more than a century of de-civilized violent gang disorder 
(Bannister and Fraser, 2008). In turn, this feeds into a historically distinctive 
and autonomous Scottish criminal justice system and welfare-based 
institutions. Within this institutional nexus, academic social science in 
Scotland shares a strong sense of common mission with policy-makers and 
practitioners in addressing social problems, gang culture, educational under-
achievement, and territorial immobility. This sense of national distinctiveness 
in Scotland is further accentuated by the devolved state-society. Since 1999 
the major functions of the central UK state, particularly social policy, have 
been devolved to a semi-autonomous Scottish state under political demands 
for increased self-government, a process that will culminate in a referendum in 
2014 for constitutional independence from the UK. This fact colors all 
discourses about the underclass in Scotland. 
 
Civilizing the underclass in Britain 
Previously disconnected folk devils began to coalesce in the 1990s with the 
emergence of the Chav figure in England as a contemptible underclass 
caricature - idle, feckless, ignorant, slovenly, petty criminal, and 
promiscuously heterosexual (Jones, 2011). Neds seemed to refer to the same 
 8 
thing in Scotland. Hayward and Yar (2006: 15) situate ‘Ned’ as only one of a 
range of localized terms while ‘Chav’ has risen to hegemonic status nationally: 
‘What is new and interesting is the way that one term – ‘chav’ – has triumphed 
above all others as the dominant synonym’. ‘Chav/Ned’ became a journalistic 
cliché for UK media fears about the wider effects of the lifestyles of the ‘white’ 
urban poor. Terms of class disdain, what Tyler (2008: 24) calls ‘disgust 
speech’, are mobilized routinely in the public sphere to point the finger at an 
undeserving stratum of social refuse: ‘This disgust speech generates a set of 
effects, which adhere to, produce, and embellish the disgusting figure of the 
chav: chavs are white, live on council (or social housing) estates, eat junk 
food, steal your phones, wear crap sports wear, drink cheap cider, they are 
the absolute dregs of modern civilization; a social underclass par excellence, 
chavs are disgusting’.  
 
Special malice is reserved for young working class women, routinely depicted 
as loathsome, self-obsessed, superficial, and promiscuous creatures (Skeggs, 
2005, Tyler, 2008). This discourse of disgust and disdain reached fever pitch 
during media coverage of the disappearance of Shannon Mathews from 
Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, England, in February 2008 in contrast to the 
(initially) sympathetic coverage of the missing child Madeleine McCann the 
previous year. While the middle class McCann family elicited widespread 
sympathy from journalists and public figures, the Mathews family faced public 
censure, moral indignation and ridicule (see Mooney and Neal, 2009/2010). 
Imagined as representative of a wider social stratum, a curious episode 
involving one troubled family became emblematic of what the journalist Carole 
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Malone (in Jones, 2011: 22), called ‘a sub (human) class that now exists in 
the murkiest, darkest corners of this country [sic]’. 
 
Much of the preoccupation with class contempt is typically limited to the 
immediate present. While the public discourse on Chavs/Neds appears to 
have emerged relatively recently it draws on much older sociolinguistic 
ideologies of class and race (Bennett, 2012). A much longer historical 
perspective of class repulsion was identified by Elias (2012: 465) when, in the 
eighteenth century, the nobility were physically repelled by the ascending 
bourgeois class: ‘Anything that touched their embarrassment-threshold smelt 
bourgeois, was socially inferior; and inversely: anything bourgeois touched 
their embarrassment-threshold. It was the necessity to distinguish themselves 
from anything bourgeois that sharpened this sensitivity …’ Clearly, the 
bourgeoisie were a rising class encroaching on the highest circles of court 
society, an entirely different socio-political dynamic from recent bouts of 
middle class contempt for disenfranchised working class youth. Nonetheless, 
emotional and moral tensions between class fractions in Britain today need to 
be embedded in the long-term socio-historical dynamic of what Elias (2012, 
2008) called ‘the civilizing process’. This refers to the long-run but unintended 
process in the West that converted the external constraints of social structure 
into internal self-restraints of bodily dispositions.  
 
This process was, and is, simultaneously social, economic, political, 
geographical, cultural and psychological. It can be very crudely sketched as 
follows: as the division of labor advances, greater social interdependencies 
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emerge; upper classes are restrained from direct physical violence; violence 
and taxation becomes an exclusive function of the state; larger geographical 
areas are pacified creating space for the money economy and an urban 
bourgeoisie to develop; self-restraint becomes increasingly automatic as it 
spreads to wider groups in society. Uninhibited gratification of the senses was 
increasingly transformed into a restrained sensibility. This sensibility demands 
emotional control and empathy with sufferers and places definite limits on 
arbitrary violence. As punishment and violence are removed from civil society, 
they become the special preserve of the centralized state.  
 
As people are compelled by the central authority of the state to live in peaceful 
inter-dependency with each other, social life becomes more predictable and 
orderly (Elias, 2012: v.2). Violent, unguarded or emotional outbursts become 
signs of weakness to be censured by impersonal powers of calculated 
reserve. For Elias a propensity to observe the disciplines of work, even when 
it can be substituted for idle comfort, is a core characteristic that distinguishes 
the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie as a dominant class from a 
decadent court aristocracy. Socially desirable behavior now appears to be 
produced voluntarily by personal initiative and self-control. The very person of 
the bourgeois individual, under self-control from the inside out, a ‘homo 
clausus’ or ‘closed person’, provides an exemplar for the whole society (Elias, 
1978: 119). Self-restraint appears to the individual as their own special ability 
rather than an effect of the impersonal mediation of social interdependencies 
of markets, commodities and functions (Elias, 2012: 150). Decorous behavior 
is valorized as the innate and natural ability of the accomplished, hard-
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working, well-adjusted middle class individual who observes the cultural 
impulse to conform to socially acceptable, hence reasonable and dignified, 
norms and values. 
 
Class and the chains of dependency  
It is the lack of cultural and personal discipline that marks out the Chav/Ned 
underclass as a de-civilizing threat. Excessive displays of degraded 
consumption by Chav/Neds offend against the closed restraint of the homo 
clausus. For Hayward and Yar (2006) work-determined conceptualizations of 
a demoralized underclass in the 1980s have been transformed into an 
ostentatious display of symbolic cultural goods by young people, with Chavs 
as symbolic of the wider ‘society of consumers’. ‘Chav’ discourses vilify urban 
youth for disgraceful forms of consumption rather than the worklessness that 
typified the ideology of the underclass in the 1980s: ’This discourse which 
pathologizes and marginalizes is fundamentally decoupled from the question 
of economic capital, replacing it instead with a perceived lack of cultural 
capital’ (Hayward and Yar, 2006: 14; see also Hollingworth and Williams, 
2009). 
 
Clearly this formulation parts company with Bourdieu’s (1984) insistence that 
economic capital and cultural capital are mutually convertible forms of 
currency. Yet Hayward and Yar (2006: 18) insist that, ‘if contemporary 
fascination with the ‘chav’ is about anything it is about a reconfiguration of the 
underclass idea through the lens of an unmediated consumer society’. On the 
contrary, consumption can never be ‘unmediated’. By placing the accent on 
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poor or tasteless consumer ‘choices’ by Chav/Neds, the many-sided 
mediation of production and consumption (as well as distribution and 
exchange) is reduced to a single transparent moment of visibility, in clothing, 
posture and gait, speech, and so on, as outward markers of the de-civilized 
subject. Consumption is always the final and most visible ‘finishing touch’ of a 
whole society based on the production of objects as exchangeable 
commodities. Consumption conditions production; it creates the need for 
production. The objects of production take on the appearance of contingent 
things which conceals the dense weave of functional interdependencies 
necessary for its existence. Once it leaves production and enters society, 
every relation to the product is an external one that depends on a long 
impersonal chain of functional interdependencies (Elias, 2012: 471-2).  
 
Desirable commodities that appear to the youth as brand markers of lifestyle 
choices in reality efface their point of origin and prior structuring in the realm 
of production and circulation. Youth subcultures like Neds may come to over-
identify with the apparent contingency of unstable ‘choices’ in branded 
products as compensation for their own lack of economic value in what Marx 
referred to as commodity fetishism. Neds consume commodities that are 
viewed by the tasteful consumer as vulgar, tainted and ridiculous. In so doing, 
the excessive fetishization of the (fake) brand by inferior social groups 
devalorizes it in practice. In their lack of cultural refinement Neds are 
reminders of insecure, menial toil which ‘civilized’ taste and manners want to 
keep at a distance behind the scenes of civilized social life. 
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Yet underclass figures like Neds are also productive for the wider civilizing 
process. They form the point of departure for an entire apparatus of 
professionals, journalists, politicians, state officials, solicitors, police officers, 
fashion designers, and so on. As Marx (MECW 30: 306) noted, even the 
criminal can be classed as ‘productive’ for the civilizing process, which always 
requires an ‘uneasy tension and agility’ for its further development: 
The criminal produces an impression, partly moral and partly tragic, as 
the case may be, and in this way renders a “service” by arousing the 
moral and aesthetic feelings of the public. The criminal breaks the 
monotony and everyday security of bourgeois life. In this way he keeps 
it from stagnation, and gives rise to that uneasy tension and agility 
without which even the spur of competition would get blunted.   
While Neds/Chavs cannot entirely take credit for the civilizing curve of 
development, Marx’s conceptualization is a necessary reminder of the 
civilizing counterpoint effect of the most dominated and reviled social groups. 
Increased integration and mutual restraint often depend on processes of 
displacement and exclusion elsewhere, what Elias sometimes described as 
the contradictory tensions of ‘civilized barbarism’.  
 
Elias (2012: 422-7) identified this phenomenon as a dual process of 
‘diminishing contrasts, increasing varieties’. Contrasts and inequalities 
between classes and state-societies are progressively reduced at the same 
time as the varieties and nuances of conduct are increased in a controlled de-
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controlling’ of emotional life. A constant tension is experienced of repulsion 
and assimilation between the classes, with variations in intensity over time 
and space but tending overall to become more even and temperate. Relations 
of dependency both exclude inferior groups at the same time as spreading the 
standards of civilized conduct. Dominant groups respond with increased 
restraint and segregation, heightening the distances and tensions in society 
still further. Yet superordinate groups are not entirely unaffected by the mores 
and standards of lower groups. Subordinate groups, like ‘the underclass’, 
lacking any possibility of upward social mobility may well exhibit a fatalistic 
vigor in their conduct and manners. From a defined position more or less fixed 
in social space dominated groups are exercised by far fewer anxieties about 
‘correct’ bourgeois standards of good form, restraint and taste. Such apparent 
freedom from dependency can exert an attraction as well as a repelling effect 
on groups more completely gripped by the exigencies of functional 
dependency, for instance in adopting street fashions, postures or argot of 
more marginal groups in a controlled decontrolling of self-restraint. 
 
The underclass and civic nationalism  
Despite claims to the contrary, explanations of Chavs as a cultural underclass 
in England cannot be readily translated to account for the ‘Ned’ phenomenon 
in Scotland (Hayward and Yar, 2006; Skeggs, 2005). In Scotland the term 
‘Ned’ has taken on symbolic freight for poverty and community breakdown 
beyond excessive and gaudy forms of consumption. Ned is falsely assumed 
to denote a ‘Non-Educated Delinquent’, a pejorative backronym that permits 
symbolic power to denigrate with impunity under the pseudo-scientific veneer 
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of an official category much like recent policy uses of NEETs (Not in 
Employment, Education or Training) to classify unemployed young people in 
the UK (Lawson, 2011). As we have already insisted, social figurations take 
shape under distinctive national forms of state-society development. As 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (2004: 236) argue, ‘each society, at each moment, 
elaborates a body of social problems taken to be legitimate, worthy of being 
debated, of being made public and sometimes officialized and, in a sense 
guaranteed by the state’. 
 
A relatively autonomous state-society in Scotland plays a strategic role in 
defining youth crime and ‘Ned culture’ in particular as a major ‘social problem’ 
in need of tackling. In February 2012, for example, a report in The Herald 
cited a survey by an insurance company which claimed that ‘Ned culture’ 
costs Scottish businesses £740m in 2011 alone with this figure set to rise as 
unemployment increases (Donnelly, 2012). In the case of Neds as a category 
of class disdain it is not simply bad cultural taste that is of concern to the 
agencies of the devolved Scottish state. Rather discourses about Neds 
construct an image of disorderly and disruptive suspect-subjects in opposition 
to marketized-images of Scotland as a neoliberal state-society engaged 
successfully in global competitive accumulation. In this context it is frequently 
claimed that Scotland is a ‘civic nation’ that has passed through ‘a social 
revolution’ unparalleled in western democracies to become a middle class 
‘professional society’ (see Law and Mooney, 2006). Further confirmation of  
the image of Scotland as a transformed civic nation appeared to come in 
August 2011 when its cities were untouched by urban riots while major 
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English cities were set aflame, leading the Scottish First Minister to claim that 
such disorders would not take place in Scotland because it is a ‘different 
society’ (Carrell, 2011).  
 
This suggests that distinctive civilizing processes internally pacified urban 
Scotland in contrast to the socio-spatial tensions punctuated by collective 
violence in urban England. Claims about civilizing processes therefore 
function as markers of national difference despite deep socio-structural 
similarities between Scotland and England. Here the Ned figure exercises a 
different cultural inflection in Scottish society in contrast to claims that the 
‘Chav’ phenomenon in England represents a new consumption-based 
‘underclass’ (Hayward and Yar, 2006; Skeggs, 2005). Ned discourse has 
longevity at street level in west central Scotland. Etymologically, usage of the 
term can be traced back at least to the 1950s, though it may have originated 
in the Edwardian period around 1910 or even further back (Coleman, 2012: 
232). Not only are urban discourses about Neds in Scotland of older vintage; 
they also take less virulent forms than the Chav phenomenon in England. 
More sympathetic representations of urban working class Scotland can be 
found in films like Peter Mullan’s 2011 film, Neds, the fiction of James Kelman 
and Agnes Owens, the poetry of Tom Leonard and, in a different register, the 
fantastical lifeworlds of Irvine Welsh stories.  
 
Nonetheless, ‘Ned’ tends to be a derogatory denominator. Young people 
rarely use the label to refer to themselves and typically reserve the label ‘Ned’ 
for other groups or individuals seen as socially inferior or physically 
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threatening. One study of the speech practices and social identities of urban 
adolescents in Glasgow found that self-identification was a highly complex 
and fraught affair for young urban working class Scots. In forming their own 
self-categorizations young people routinely negotiate cultural spaces within 
particular peer networks and authority figures as ‘normal’ in contrast to Ned 
pathologies: 
 
Int: So what are you then, what group would you like to be in? 
Youth 1: Normal. 
What are normal people like?  
Me … I don’t know what group I’m in, ’cause my ma’ll [mother will] says 
to me – you’re a wee hairy [promiscuous female]. I go – no, I’m no. She 
goes – aye, you are. Then when I talk, my pals go – you pure talk like a 
wee Ned. 
 
Int: What are you then? 
Youth 2: I’m a wee Glasgow person. I wouldnae say I’m a Ned ‘cause I 
don’t go oot and start fights an’ aw that. I wouldn’t say I’m a wee geeky 
person either. 
(in Timmins et al, 2004) 
 
Working class people in Scotland have long been exposed to the class 
condescension of everyday speech forms, coded as socially incompetent 
‘slang’ dialects by traditional authority figures even as other, more formal 
contrasts between classes decay (Stuart-Smith, 1999).  
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Moreover, this symbolic ascription of negative attributes to an entire social 
stratum has recently led to the re-categorization of the British working class as 
an ethnic group. This conflation of class and race draws from a deep well of 
inferiority categorizations of subordinate groups. In Victorian Britain working 
class were subject to middle class condescension and opprobrium in being 
cast as colonized subjects faring little better in the hierarchy of ‘civilized’ 
values than the dominated peoples of the British Empire (Bonnett, 1998). 
Racial discourses are often invoked to establish inferior subject positions in 
social space. Racialization is often neglected in the construction of ‘juvenile 
delinquency’ in the West (Chavez-Garcia, 2007). In the UK ‘Chavs’ have 
become synonymous with the ‘white working class’ while the category 
‘working class’ is increasingly synonymous with poor whites (Nayak, 2006, 
Sveinsson, 2009). Stoked by the BBC Television’s White season in 2007, 
much publicized liberal angst was displayed about the effects of an 
abandoned ‘white’ working class supposedly unable to adjust to multicultural 
Britain and tempted to seek collective refuge in defensive, exclusionary 
identities of neo-fascists like the British National Party and the English 
Defence League (Rhodes, 2011) and the ‘British jobs for British workers’ wave 
of illegal solidarity strikes in January 2009.  
 
Defining the ‘white’ working class mainly in terms of ethnicity rather than 
social and economic factors shifts the issue away from pronounced social 
injustices, entrenched and widened by neoliberal political economy, to 
subjective matters of culture, attitude and lifestyle (Haylett, 2001, Nayak, 
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2006). Similarly, Neds are discussed as referring to the ‘white’ working class 
in Scotland, the ethnic equivalent to the ‘whiteness’ of Chavs in England (see 
Raisborough and Adams, 2008). However, such attributions ignore the 
relative absence of ethnic categorizations for the working class in Scotland. 
Across almost all public discourse in Scotland, civic nationalism eclipses 
ethnic nationalism, although an unspoken relationship exists between the 
categories (Kamusella, 2012). Here the sole exception appears to be ethno-
religious ‘sectarian’ divisions between Protestants and Catholics at football 
games. Crowd misconduct at football games is to be civilized by the Scottish 
government through the introduction in 2012 of new legislation, The Offensive 
Behavior at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 
that redefines as a ‘sectarian hate crime’ any offensive reference to the 
religious or political posture of rival fans. 
 
Beyond the arbitrary ethnicization of class in Scotland, constructions of a de-
civilized universe ‘re-animalizes’ degraded people and places by collapsing 
any distinction between nature and culture. In this way the most dominated 
and reviled social groups can be exiled from the public culture of the civic 
nation. Class habitus and environmental habitat become indistinguishable. For 
instance, Haylett (2003: 61-3) notes an implicit correlation between council 
housing, ‘estate culture’ and ‘welfare culture’ in England. This semantic 
culture-nature slippage enables ‘disorderly’ and ‘dysfunctional’ aspects of 
urban working class habitus to be perceptually restructured in quasi-
animalistic terms (see also Cook, 2006: 43-46). While not solely an ‘urban 
phenomenon’ in Scotland, Ned culture and behavior are assumed to be the 
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marginalized practices of disaffected and alienated working class youth in ‘the 
schemes’ of Scotland’s large public housing estates (see Johnstone and 
Mooney, 2007; Law, Mooney and Helms, 2010). Public housing has played a 
major historical role in the fabric of urban Scotland and retains a symbolic 
significance as degraded criminogenic environments (Damer, 1989). 
 
Public housing estates in urban Scotland are constructed as de-civilized 
locales, populated by animalistic creatures who naturalistically revel in 
deserved material and cultural poverty. This trope surfaced with particular 
venom over the Glasgow East by-election in 2008, when populist class hatred 
among mainly London-based journalists pathologized the area and its people 
as ‘Shettleston Man’ culturally locked into welfare despondency and self-
exclusion (Mooney, 2009). De-industrialized cities like Glasgow and Dundee 
undoubtedly have deep-seated problems. Until recently, Glasgow had some 
of the highest levels of people on Incapacity Benefit, a particular target for 
anti-working class diatribes. At its peak one in five working age adults were 
claiming Incapacity Benefit, yet after 2003 the number of claimants began 
falling faster than elsewhere. A major academic study shows that this pattern 
represents a form of ‘disguised unemployment’, not a welfare dependency-
despondency subculture. It reflects the loss of 100,000 manufacturing jobs in 
the city between 1971 and 1991 - during the 1980s Glasgow fell precipitously 
from 208 to tenth place in the UK for economic inactivity rates - followed by 
improvements in the local job market in the early 2000s, concurrent with 
falling numbers on Incapacity Benefit (Webster, et al, 2010). 
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While Glasgow and the Clydeside conurbation feature most prominently in 
many of the stories and representations of Ned behavior, most of Scotland’s 
main towns and cities are assumed to have a Ned ‘problem’. Towns like 
Dundee are subject to a semantic invective of class, gender and public 
housing on hostile websites that operate under the ideological alibi that it’s 
‘just a laugh’ (Law, 2006a; see also Jones, 2011). Such sites simultaneously 
mock the poverty of public housing, promiscuous teenage mothers, endemic 
criminality, dissolute lifestyles, welfare dependency, squalid environment, and 
the supposedly general lack of cultural taste among the poor. 
 
Civilizing through criminalizing 
As a derogatory term ‘Ned’ emerged from the streets of Glasgow to become 
synonymous with disgraceful cultural forms, bestial youth gangs, knife crime 
and territorial violence. This is especially evident in some of the ways in which 
the criminal justice system in Scotland is arguably converging with the more 
punitive and draconian measures in England and Wales to deal with suspect 
subjects, primarily the impoverished working class, young people and women 
(see Croall, Mooney and Munro, 2010). Here the Scottish state is engaged in 
a process of internal pacification for problem places and problem people as 
the last remaining vestiges of de-civilized urbanism.  
 
With the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999 there was, in 
theory at least, some potential for the already distinctive and separate Scottish 
criminal justice system to diverge markedly from the policies and practices of 
criminal justice in England and Wales. A democratic concern with welfare and 
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rehabilitation have long been claimed to form the distinguishing core of the 
Scottish criminal justice system (McAra, 1999). As a consequence 
communitarian public provision of welfare and mutual support appear as key 
civic or civilizing values (McAra, 2004). First, the 1932 Children and Young 
Persons (Scotland) Act imposed a statutory duty on Courts to prioritize the 
welfare of the child. In the late 1960s the creation of Children’s Hearings 
panels promoted rehabilitation rather than retribution in order to avoid the 
criminalization of children (Croall, 2005; Ferguson, 2005; McAra, 2004, 2006). 
The welfarist philosophy of Kibrandron was the dominant approach to youth 
justice in Scotland for 30 years until the Children (Scotland) Act of 1995 
substituted the principle of protection of the child as offender with the principle 
of protection of the public as victim.  
 
Since the early 2000s there has been a steady shift in Scottish criminal 
justice, particularly in the field of youth justice, towards a more penal stance, 
eroding the promise that devolution would strengthen Scotland’s traditional 
welfare ethos. Indeed signs of a shift towards a more punitive approach were 
already evident in 1998, when young people living on public housing estates 
in the Scottish town of Hamilton were subjected to a six-month curfew. Under 
this scheme any young people under the age of 15 on the streets after 8pm 
judged by the police to represent a danger to themselves or to others were 
escorted home to their parents’ care (The Guardian, April 11, 1998).  
 
Notable here is a decade-long politics of ‘anti-social behavior’ (ASB) (see 
Krause, this volume). The construction of ‘anti-social behavior’ as a key 
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criminal justice issue in Scotland, closely parallels in important respects the 
emergence of an ASB ‘problem’ in England and Wales, fuelled by a growing 
middle class concern with the ‘problem’ of young repeat offenders. This 
concern was reflected in the Partnership Agreement between Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats in forming the ruling Scottish Executive between 2003 and 
2007 (Scottish Executive, 2003a). In the 2003 Scottish Executive Report, 
Putting Our Communities First (2003b), for instance, ASB includes young 
people ‘hanging around’ and other relatively minor transgressions of common 
decency such as litter, graffiti and dog fouling! In the culture, retail and leisure-
led regeneration of Glasgow, a New York-style ‘zero tolerance’ of ‘aggressive 
begging’, prostitution, gangs, alcohol and general ‘anti-social’ conduct 
attempted to sweep the city centre economy clean of its urban dross (Helms, 
2008). 
 
Behind this ambiguity, however, lies a remorseless concern with behavior 
modification. In turn, underlying structural causes of urban deprivation are 
largely ignored and/or marginalized. Instead the threat of withdrawal of benefit 
entitlements and other punitive measures predominate (Rodger, 2008). More 
important, the ideology of ASB has the effect of lowering the threshold 
between everyday life and the criminal justice system. A greater range of 
behaviors and lifestyles now fall under the gaze and policies of the state and 
social control agencies (Cook, 2006: 80). Such sentiments are reflected in 
more unforgiving approaches to youth criminal justice. In 2002 an Action Plan 
to Reduce Youth Crime was published which pinpointed repeat and persistent 
offenders as a key target. In 2003 Pilot Fast Track hearings for youth 
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offenders and a Pilot Youth Court scheme were launched (with the Minster for 
Justice commenting that ‘punishment is a key part of the youth justice 
process’) at Hamilton and Airdrie Sheriff’s Court (see Piacentini and Walters, 
2006). In 2004 the Anti-Social Behaviour (Scotland) Act included the 
extension of ASBOs to include 12-16 year olds, police powers to disperse 
groups, the provision of electronic tagging to under-16s, Community 
Reparation Orders (for those aged 12+) and Parental Orders. Amidst political 
and media rhetoric about ‘plagues of group disorder’ (Margaret Curran, 
quoted in The Scotsman, June 18, 2004), one could be forgiven for thinking 
that Scotland was gripped by a massive and general upsurge in youth crime. 
This heightened politics of youth criminality coincided with a spike in recorded 
crime in Scotland, which, since that point, has been in steady decline, falling 
to its lowest level in thirty years by 2010 (The Scottish Government, 2011). 
 
With the election of a minority Scottish National Party (SNP) Scottish 
Government in 2007, and subsequently its re-election as a majority 
government in 2011, it has generally been accepted that the SNP have been 
less punitive than its Labour-Liberal Democrat predecessors (see McNeill, 
2010). At the May 2011 Scottish elections it was Labour that presented a 
much more punitive message than the SNP. The clearest indications of a 
‘softer’ approach from the SNP in government is that there has been a 
markedly reduced concern with anti-social behavior and less of an emphasis 
on the behavior and problems of persistent young offenders. The SNP 
Government’s approach in this area, reflected in the key policy document, 
Preventing Offending by Young People: A Framework for Action (Scottish 
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Government, 2008) reflects what McAra and McVie (2010) have characterized 
as an ‘uneasy’ mix of welfarist, actuarialist and retributive influences. The 
welfarist elements are evident from the outset, the document beginning with a 
largely positive statement about the contribution of young people to Scottish 
society in general (McNeil 2010:51). An emphasis on children’s well-being 
connected youth crime to welfare institutions such as education and health, 
maintaining a distance from the criminal justice system, while at the same 
time favoring early and intensive intervention for those classed as at ‘risk’. 
While it is important to remain cautious about claims about the welfarist basis 
of criminal justice policy in Scotland, especially in relation to youth justice 
(Muncie, 2005), the approach of the SNP government marks something of a 
retreat from the steady trend in the early to mid 2000s towards a convergence 
in youth justice policy making in Scotland with that in England and Wales, 
which remains by most measures much more punitive (see Croall, 2012).  
 
De-civilizing media and symbolic power 
While Elias examined ‘manners books’ from the Middle Ages onwards to chart 
the emergence of self-restraint and correct conduct among the upper classes 
in Europe, in the present, a broad range of mass media perform a similar 
function as texts concerned to instruct audiences in good taste and conduct. 
Scotland not only has a semi-state apparatus of its own but also a quasi-
autonomous media of long standing (Blain and Hutchison, 2008). Much of the 
output of television in Scotland concerns comedy, current affairs and sport. It 
also has a tradition of documentary ‘realist’ film-making about social problems.  
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As moral lessons against social impropriety and incompetence, television 
programs typically invite viewers to adopt an affronted bourgeois stance of 
superiority, good taste and social competence in contrast to the inept displays 
of social inferiority, cultural ignorance and domestic incompetence of the lower 
classes (Law and Mooney, 2011/12). One of the most popular television 
programs in Scotland in recent decades is the comedy series Chewin’ the Fat 
produced by BBC Scotland. This features a series of sketches and skits 
including two characters immediately recognizable by Scottish viewers as ‘the 
Neds’, attired in ‘typical’ Ned clothing, Burberry-style check baseball caps and 
tracksuits (‘trackies’). Chewing the Fat also features sketches about ‘Ned TV’ 
and a Glasgow-based ‘Ned Swimming Gala’ in which violence, disorder and 
mayhem in general are presented as the key cultural attributes of Neds (Law, 
2006a).  
 
While comedic representations may strike a sympathetically parodic tone, 
more realist depictions can have an insidious ideological effect in portrayals of 
the urban poor as barbarous beasts. This was graphically announced by a 
controversial documentary made in urban Scotland The Scheme (BBC, 
2010/11) which depicted the daily lives of six families from the Onthank and 
Knockinlaw impoverished housing estates in Kilmarnock (Law and Mooney, 
2011/12). A cast of characters were seen to battle against a series of material, 
personal and social disadvantages: drug dependency, petty crime, casual 
violence, dog soiled carpets, ASBOS, teenage pregnancy and abortion, single 
parenting, foul language, imprisonment, ill health and bereavement. Originally 
promoted by BBC Scotland as ‘a snapshot of life in modern day Scotland’, the 
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cast of characters and location is not at all representative of Scottish society. 
The most that a BBC Scotland spokeswoman could claim was that ‘it is 
representative of the six families who took part’. Although the program was 
promoted as emblematic of ‘important social problems’, on the contrary, it can 
lay no claim to depicting the typical characteristics of even the bottom decile 
of Scottish society. 
 
Some compared the stigmatization effect that The Scheme had on Onthank 
with that of a BBC documentary, The Fourth World, about the Lilybank 
scheme in 1970s Glasgow (Alexander, 2010). But the earlier documentary 
was a more earnest exercise in serious social documentary analysis, centered 
around the participant observation of social policy academic and activist Kay 
Carmichael’s attempt to adjust to ‘the hostile and ugly’ world during a three 
month stay in the scheme. It gave expression to bored teenagers, gang fights, 
casual violence, glue sniffing and vandalism, fractious neighbors and 
tempestuous public exchanges. But where The Fourth World had a sense of 
political mission and social analysis, however limited, The Scheme flatters a 
morbid fascination for abject social suffering.  Little sense is provided of the 
wider forces of neoliberal political economy that have over the past thirty 
years restructured the material conditions of life for former industrial working 
class communities in Kilmarnock and elsewhere across urban Scotland.  
 
INSERT Table One and Figure One around here 
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As well as broadcast media, the ‘Ned’ underclass figures regularly in 
Scotland’s semi-autonomous print media, which routinely clothes itself as 
distinctively ‘Scottish’ (that is, not English and increasingly not specifically 
British either) (Law, 2001). The use of Neds in the Scottish press expresses a 
distinctive temporal pattern and more intensive usage than Chavs in the press 
in England. Taking the blunt instrument of a Lexis-Nexis search of selected 
Scottish newspapers1 (not including Scottish editions of large circulation 
papers like The Sun), the term ‘Neds’ was barely mentioned by the press in 
the 1990s except in the ‘humorous’ columns of Jack Mclean and Tom Shields 
in The Herald.  Table One and Figure One show that this has increased 
steadily, especially since 1999 – the year of the opening of the Scottish 
Parliament – and reached a peak of more than a thousand citations in 2003 – 
the year when political concerns with Ned behavior were at their zenith and 
when an attempt was made in the Scottish Parliament to ban the use of the 
term. This compares with the highpoint for ‘Chavs’ of all UK newspapers of 
946 mentions in 2005 found by Hayward and Yar (2006: 10). While the overall 
trend since the early 2000s has been downwards, nonetheless post-2003 the 
number of citations has consistently been higher than pre-2003. Between 
2001 and 2006 the well-known Scottish tabloid the Daily Record and sister 
paper Sunday Mail used the term three times more regularly than the ‘quality’ 
Glasgow papers The Herald and Sunday Herald, who tended to use it twice 
as much as the Edinburgh-based Scotsman and Scotland on Sunday papers. 
Since the high point of 2003/2004 use of the term in these newspapers has 
                                                 
1 The frequency count provides a rough approximation of the pattern of ‘Ned’ usage in the 
Scottish press. It includes occasional uses of ‘Ned’ as abbreviation for the name Edward and 
the country Netherlands.  
 29 
generally declined albeit unevenly. The Daily Record and Sunday Mail, 
however, continued to have at least twice the number of citations as the other 
main Scottish papers though, surprisingly, in 2010/2011, the frequency of Ned 
citations in The Herald/Sunday Herald appeared to surpass that of the Daily 
Record and Sunday Mail (see Figure TWO). These papers cater for a 
predominantly west-central Scotland readership, the region that spawned the 
Ned as a colloquial figure. 
 
Insert Figure Two around here 
 
Print culture also spawned a new genre of Chav-Ned humor. Ned joke books 
began to appear, including The Little Book of Neds (2005), Ned Jokes (2007) 
and Ned Speak (2006) by Lee Bok, who is also credited with the equally 
vitriolic The Little Book of Chavs (2004) and The Chav Guide to Life (2006). 
The Little Book Of Chavs quickly sold out its first print run of 100,000, an 
indication that these cheaply produced texts struck a wider chord about class 
anxieties and that hate humor can prove a profitable enterprise. These books 
recycle the same hackneyed hateful jokes that once passed for publicly 
acceptable ‘banter’ directed against subordinate groups like ethnic minorities, 
women and homosexuals (Billig, 2001).  
 
Amidst this spate of hate humor books appeared Nedworld in 2005, which 
satirizes ‘Ned’ culture under the pseudonyms ‘Kylie Pilrig’ and ‘Keanu 
McGlinchy’. It attempts this in the vernacular of the Glaswegian working class 
but fails to maintain anything like a consistent narrative voice, standing as it 
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does far outside the stereotyped milieu it aims to humorously depict. From 
start to finish a torrent of stereotyped class hatred is unleashed in Nedworld 
that would be legally impossible against any other minority group in the UK. It 
purports to shed humorous insight into ‘the outrageous lifestyle of the ASBO 
generation’. In fact its clichéd jokes merely repeat the typical race hate jokes 
so common to British society in the 1970s. This example is indicative of 
hundreds of others similar in tone and structure: 
 
A ned died pure poor and many local shops donated money to the fund 
for his funeral out of sympathy. The manager of the jeweller’s was asked 
to donate a fiver. ‘Only a fiver?’, he asked. ‘Only a fiver to bury Brad-Pitt 
Mackenzie? Here’s a cheque. Go and bury one hundred of them?’ (Pilrig 
and McGlinchy, 2005: 64). 
 
Here the reader is invited to share the genocidal desire of the joke teller for 
the physical elimination of ‘Neds’ in their hundreds. It may be objected that ‘its 
only a joke’ but as the rhetorical psychologist Michael Billig (2001) notes, hate 
jokes dissemble in their enmity towards less powerful stereotyped groups. In 
the case of such jokes the reader is asked to identify with the sentiments of 
someone speaking from a more dominant position in social space, here a 
manager of a jeweler shop, and with the view that homicidal hatred of the 
‘pure poor’ and ‘Neds’ as an entire social group is justified. As one reviewer 
noted, the book provides  
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an index of middle-class fears about the underclass [sic]. It had to be 
written sooner or later and is, in some perverse way, timely. It flies in the 
face of politically correct ideas about representing the long-term 
unemployed, the urban poor, the non-educated and delinquent. 
(Morrison, 2005) 
 
In contrast to the ‘ultimate race hate word’, the n-word, which as Billig (2001: 
278) notes, ‘announces hatred without semantic constraint’, ‘Ned’ has become 
a word that can be invoked over and over again since little semantic social 
constraint or self-restraint is demanded when referring to the most dominated 
social group of the ‘white’ working class. Ned-type characters of ridicule even 
appeared in children’s comic papers like The Beano, a popular comic 
produced in Dundee. It featured a new family, ‘The Neds’, comprising ‘Ned’, 
‘Nedette’ and their kids, ‘Asbo’ and ‘Chavette’ (December 17, 2005 and April 
18, 2006; see Raisborough and Adams, 2008), leading to protests in the 
Scottish Parliament against ‘classism’ and challenges from Scotland’s 
Children’s Commissioner (Sunday Times, February 5, 2006; The Scotsman, 
February 6, 2006). These counter-protests against denigration represent yet 
another indication of some of the ambivalences about ‘Neds’ in Scottish civic 
and political institutions, in sharp contrast to the widespread contempt for 
Chavs so effortlessly expressed by the English political and media 




For some sociologists ‘working class’ is primarily a cultural or moral category 
as much as or more than it is a dynamic socio-economic relationship (Sayer, 
2005). In this perspective, class is considered ‘relational’ insofar as it is 
constructed through the attribution or denial of moral worth by some other 
group with sufficient social power to make authoritative value judgments. 
Sociologists appear less concerned to foreground the historical processes and 
impersonal structuring of unequal social positions by political economy and 
public policy agendas. A focus on the tension identified by Elias between 
civilizing and de-civilizing processes resituates cultural and material 
marginality within the curve of development of Scotland as a distinct state-
society. From this perspective, it becomes necessary to distinguish Neds from 
Chavs as marginalized devil figures within the distinctive socio-political 
trajectories of Scotland and England. 
 
Of course, as marginalized underclass figures subject to overlapping histories 
of class disgust, Neds and Chavs share a set of attributed characteristics: 
tasteless clothing, alcohol and drug abuse, violence, sexual promiscuity, 
territorial gang membership, loud, risky and reckless conduct. As a collectively 
imagined category, the Chav/Ned figure offends against the ideological and 
psychological weight of a much longer ‘civilizing process’ of class 
conditioning. Within the process of ‘diminishing contrasts, increasing 
varieties’, the recent ideological spurt of underclass contempt for Neds and 
Chavs elicits emotional repulsion and disgust for lower social groups. Middle 
class fear, shame and embarrassment are palpable responses to the 
(mediated) presence of class crudity. In a period of rapid and uncertain social 
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change, anything seen as shameful for aspirational social groups is filtered 
through an all-encompassing prism of social inferiority. As a denigrated social 
body, the figure of the Chav/Ned reeks of impropriety and, contrariwise, 
cultural vulgarity smells of the Chav/Ned. 
 
However, the ascription of shared consumption and behavioral patterns 
applicable to both Neds and Chavs accepts at face value generic labels of 
‘incivility’ that obscure national (and local) differences in social development. 
The social, institutional, media and political agitation over Neds in Scotland 
has distinct national aspects. These need to be carefully delineated. Rather 
than homogenizing dominated social groups under the sign of the Chav figure 
particular to England as a state-society, a different historical development of 
state-society in Scotland suggests that the Ned represents a more ambiguous 
underclass figure. It can be called upon to symbolize good-natured humor or 
social critique but equally may be mobilized for moral outrage and 
criminalization processes. Elias has been invoked by academics to highlight 
the ‘criminalization’ of welfare as a new phase in the de-civilizing process 
(Rodger, 2008). This tends to operate as a single process across the UK, 
albeit allowing for some policy differences in Scotland, as more punitive and 
draconian than in the past in raising public fears about ‘incivility’ rather than 
addressing traditional concerns about equality and social justice. In contrast, 
we have sought to provide a longer-run perspective which emphasizes the 
tension between civilizing and de-civilizing processes (plural) within the curve 
of national development in Scotland as a distinct state-society. Here the 
nationally autonomous institutions of Scottish state and civil society – the 
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criminal justice system, policy-making networks, government, and media 
producers – rely on the ‘anti-social’ underclass figure of the Ned to formalize 
the civilizing process and to correct and modify informal urban subcultures 
developed over a century or more. Civilizing pressures are not a zero-sum 
process of repulsion and exclusion but are marked by ambivalences and 
mediations in the dialectical tensions generated by class positioning in social 
space. 
 
While the major welfare functions of the state were devolved to Scotland a 
dozen years ago, and with the UK state increasingly losing its territorial 
integrity, the Scottish government finds itself torn between welfare nationalism 
and competitive nationalism (Law and Mooney, 2012). Within this 
contradictory space, civilizing processes are subject to the dynamic tensions 
produced by the formal, external demands of the civic-welfare nation and the 
informal pressures of individuals competing in crisis-prone marketized 
conditions. Neds appear as a de-civilizing underclass counterpoint to the 
devolved state-society welfare bargain conceived as a national platform for 
competitive accumulation. A new phase of public austerity, deepening 
neoliberal priorities and the Independence referendum in 2014 will ensure that 
problematic and ambivalent representations of the underclass will remain 
subject to the development of Scotland as a distinctive state-society. 
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